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ABSTRACT
This paper makes the case that purposive, profit-seeking investments in knowledge
play a critical role in the long-run growth process. First, we review the implications of
neoclassical growth theory and the more recent theories of "endogenous growth". Then we
discuss the empirical evidence that bears on the modeling of long-run growth. Finally, we
describe in more detail a model of growth based on endogenous technological progress and
discuss the lessons that such models can teach us.
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and NBER and NBERCan economic growth be sustained in the long run? If so, what determines the long-
run rate of growth? Which economies will grow the fastest? And what kinds of policies can
governmentsuseto accelerate advances in living standards? These questions were central for
those who studied growth in the 1950s and 1960s, and remain so in the recent revival of
interest in long-run economic performance.
Two observations have motivated many of the recent contributors to growth theory.
First, output expansion has outpaced population growth in the two hundred years since the
industrial revolution. Second, different countries have remained on seemingly disparate
growth paths for relatively long periods of time. Related to this second observation is
another: in cross-section and time-series data, we find national and regional growth rates
correlated with a variety of economic, social, and political variables, including many that are
affected by government policies. These observations have led the current generation of
growth theorists to formulate models in which per capita income grows indefinitely and long-
run performance reflects structural and policy parameters of the local and global economy.
With this apparent similarity in intentions, recent research efforts have headed in
several different directions. One strand of theory continues to see capital accumulation --
thoughconceivably with a broad interpretation of capital that includes human capital --as
the driving force behind economic growth. In the work of Jones and Manuelli (1990), King
and Rebelo (1990), and Rebelo (1991), firms continually add to their stocks of capital in a
perfectly competitive environment with constant returns to scale. Perfect competition requires
that this capital be paid its marginal product, which must stay above the (subjective) discount
rate for investment to remain profitable. The authors simply posit a lower bound on the—2—
privatereturn to capital as a property of the aggregate productionfunction, thus assuring that
vestmentcontinues to be profitable. A second approach casts external economies in a
leading role in the growth process. According to. this view, when individuals or firms
accumulate new capital, they inadvertently contribute to the productivity of capita.! held by
others. Such spillovers may occur in the course of investment in physical capital (Arrow,
1962) or human capital (Lucas, 1988). As Romer (1986) has pointed out, if the spillovers
are strong enough, the private marginal product of (physical or human) capital can remain
permanently above the discount rate, even if individual investments would face diminishing
returns in the absence of the external boosts to productivity.1 Growth can be sustained by
continuing accumulation of the inputs that generate the positive externalities.
These two approaches offer logically coherent explanations of sustained, policy-
sensitive growth. Moreover, they lend many insights into the theoretical properties of
dynamic models. But, in our view, they do not identify the mechanism by which real-world
growth truly is sustained. It seems to us --asindeed it did to Schumpeter (1934), Solow
(1970, p. 33), and countless others --thatimprovements in technology have been the real
force behind perpetually rising standards of living. Also, we believe that most technological
progress requires, at least at some stage, an intentional investment of resources by profit-
seeking firms or entrepreneurs. This perspective has led us to join Romer (1990), Aghion
and Howitt (1992), and others in developing formal models that cast industrial innovation as
the engine of growth. With the aid of these models one can now investigate whether a
decentralized market economy provides adequate incentives for rapid accumulation of
commercial technology and one can examine how variations in economic structures,—3—
institutions, and policies translate into different rates of productivity gain.
This paper will not attempt to review the burgeoning theoretical literature on
endogenous growth.Rather we have two more modest objectives in mind. First, we hope
to convince the reader that purposive, profit-seeking investments in knowledge play a critical
role in the long-run growth process. Second, we hope to convey a sense of the models of
endogenous technological progress that have been developed so far and of the lessons they
can teach us.
TECHNOLOGY AS THE ENGINE OF GROWIH
Neoclassical growth theory, as developed by Solow (1956) and his followers, has
dominated economists' thinking about long-term or "trend movements in per capita income
for more than three decades. Solow focused attention on the process of capital formation.
Aggregate savings, he argued, finance additions to the national capital stock. An economy
with an initially low capital-labor ratio will have a high marginal product of capital. Then, if
a constant fraction of the income generated by a new piece of equipment is saved, the gross
investment in new capital goods may exceed the amount needed to offset depreciation and to
equip new members of the workforce. Over time, capital per worker will rise, which (with
constant returns to scale and a fixed technology) will generate a decline in the marginal
product of capital. But if the marginal product continues to fall, the savings generated by the
income accruing to new capital also will fall, and will eventually be only just sufficient to
replace worn-out machines and equip new workers. At this point the economy enters a-4-
stationarystate with ai unchanging standard of living.
Cass (1965) and others showed that this same gloomy prediction survives in a version
of the model with a more fully articulated theory of savings. If households save to spread
their consumption optimally, then --bethey long-lived altruistic families or short-lived selfish
individuals --theirsavings will respond to available rates of return. Additions to the
aggregate capital stock will occur only if the marginal machine yields a return at least as great
as a household's marginal willingness to delay consumption. But a rising capital-labor ratio
means a falling return on investment when technology is characterized by constant returns, so
the incentive to accumulate capital might easily vanish over time.
The early authors recognized that stagnating per capita incomes were not an inevitable
implication of the neoclassical model. Provided that the marginal product of capital remained
above a certain level, the economy with a fixed technology could continue to grow
indefinitely. The marginal product of capital could remain high even as the capital-labor ratio
grew large if raw labor and other nonaccumulable factors were inessential inputs into
production.2 For example, an aggregate production function with a constant elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor greater than one would do the trick (Solow, 1956, pp.
70-I). Still, the growth theorists of the time generally dismissed this possibility by imposing
"Inada" conditions --thatis, a marginal product of capital that approaches zero as capital per
worker grows large —soas to ensure convergence to a steady state.
Despite this, the neoclassical growth theorists were not pessimistic about the long-run
prospects for the aggregate economy. They viewed their out-of-steady-state dynamics as a
story about the "medium run," when capital-labor ratios would be rising over time. During a—5—
transitionperiod, autonomous investment in machinery and equipment would be a primary
force behind rising incomes, and policies that altered the savings rate could be used to
accelerate growth. But even when the transitional phase would come to an end economic
growth could proceed unabated, if technical knowledge were to expand over time. Solow
showed that with advances in technology --whichhe took to augment the productivity of
labor at an exogenous and constant rate --themarginal product of capital need not decline as
capital per worker increased. Rather, improvements in labor productivity would augment the
stock of "effective" workers. Even with a constant population, the capital stock would grow
in the long run to keep pace with the effective labor force.
We concur with the decision to rely on advances in technology, rather than properties
of the aggregate production functions, as a means of squaring the predictions of their models
with the facts of persistent growth. In our view, a story of growth that neglects technological
progress is both ahistorical and implausible. Surely the earth's (relatively) fixed stocks of
land, natural resources, and raw labor would impart diminishing returns to accumulated
inputs if those inputs were forever combined to produce a fixed set of goods by unchanging
methods. Indeed, econometric estimates of aggregate production functions confirm our
suspicion that returns to physical capital, human capital, and other accumulable factors are far
from constant.
The growth theorist need not choose between models that emphasize technology and
those that emphasize capital accumulation. Even in a world in which technological progress
provides the engine of long-run growth, accumulation will play an independent role during a
(perhaps prolonged) transitional phase. !4o one would deny the importance of investment in—6—
physical capital in explaining, for example, Japanese and western European growth after the
war, or the experiences of Korea and Singapore more recently. And when the incentive for
capital deepening abates, accumulation may still act as the wtransmission of growth, as when
new ideas mustbeembodied in machinery and equipment before they give rise to tangible
products.
Andwhat of the endogeneity of technological progress? Some might argue that
technology is driven by science, which may proceed at a pace and in a direction that is
largely independent of economic incentives. But few scholars of industrial innovation accept
this view. The commercial exploitation of scientific ideas almost always requires a substantial
investment of resources. This is the conclusion of countless studies of particular industries
and innovations, including those on machine tools (Rosenberg, 1963), aircraft (Constant,
1980), synthetic chemicals (Freeman, 1982), metallurgy (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989), and
semiconductors (Dosi, 1984), to name but a few. According to these studies, firms have
invested in new technologies when they have seen an opportunity to earn profits. In fact, a
large proportion of the scientific research conducted in the OECD countries is financed by
private industry.3 In such a setting, the institutional, legal, and economic environments that
determine the profitability of these investments surely must affect the pace and direction of
technological change. And even in the less developed countries, where technical knowledge
would seem to be available off the shelf,w learning to use that technology is far from costless
(Pack and Westphal, 1986), and the rate of dissemination reflects the institutions,
property-rights regime, and pricing structure that together determine the private profitability
of acquiring knowledge.—7—
INTERPRETING ThE EVIDENCE
Can theneoclassical growth model --withdecreasing returns to capital, perfect
competition, and exogenoustechnology -- fullyexplain the cross-country variation in per
capita incomes and national growth rates? Paul Romer (1986, 1989a) has claimed not,
pointing to two seeming tensions between the model's predictions and the historical evidence.
First, the growth rate of the world's technological leader has been rising over time, not
falling, which can happen in the neoclassical model only if the pace of exogenous
technological progress steadily accelerates. Second, countries appear not to be converging to
a common level of per capita income, as they must in the neoclassical model if they share
similar savings behavior and technologies.
An influential paper by Mankiw, David Romer, and Weil (1992) challenges this view.
These authors argue that the evidence on the international disparity in levels of per capita
income and rates of growth is quite consistent with a standard Solow model, once it has been
augmented to include human capital as an accumulable factor and to allow for cross-country
differences in savings rates that may reflect differences in tastes or culture. To make their
case, they begin by assuming that every country has its own Cobb-Douglas aggregate
production function and its own exogenous rates of savings and population growth.In the
Solow growth model this would imply convergence to different steady-state paths for per
capita income, as represented in the following equation:
In y(t) =InA1 +g1t+
1 —a1In s
1 In (n +gj +—8—
Here, y1(t)isper capita income in country i at time t (when the country has already entered a
steady state with constant growth rate g1), A1 represents a multiplicative factor in the
aggregate production function that augments the productivity of labor at time 0, a1 denotes the
exponent on capital in this same production function (and also capital's share of income), s1 is
the country'ssavingsrate, and n,andare the rates of population growth, labor-
augmenting technological progress, and capital depreciation, respectively. This equation
states that a country will have higher per capita income at a point in time (in the steady state)
the more productive are its workers initially, the faster is its technological progress, the
higher is its savings rate, and the lower are its rates of depreciation and population growth.
A high savings rate means that much of current output is devoted to installing new capital,
while low depreciation and population growth rates mean that little of the new capital must be
used to replace old machines or to equip new workers. Together these imply a high long-run
capital-labor ratio, which translates into abundant income per worker, especially when the
elasticity of output with respect to capital (that is, the coefficient a) is large.
Mankiw et a]. estimate this equation by ordinary least squares, using the Real National
Accounts data from Summers and Heston (1988) for 98 non-oil-producing countries. But
before they do so, they introduce some additional restrictions. First, they assume that
countries are closed to international capital flows, so that the ratio of investment to GDP can
be used to represent the national savings rate. Next, they assume that depreciation rates and
capital shares are the same in all countries. Third, they suppose that the multiplicative factor
on the production function has a country-specific component; A1 =a+ E1,whereaisa
constant and Ei an independently and identically distributed random variable. According to—9—
the authors,this variable reflectsidiosyncratic national characteristics such as natural resource
endowments,climate, institutions, andsoon. Finally, andmostcritically, they imaginethat
all countrieshave experienced the same rate of technological progress,sothatthe
country-specificparameter g can be replaced by a common parameter g.
Imposing these assumptions, they find in their regressions the predicted signs on the
savings and population growth variables (positive and negative, respectively) but the estimated
size of a does not conform to independent observations of capital's income share. So they
augment the Solow model to allow for accumulation of human capital (at an exogenous rate
unrelated to s1), proxy the rate of investment in human capital by the percentage of the
working age population in secondary school, and re-estimate. Now they find coefficients of
plausible magnitude and a model fit much to their liking (an adjusted R2 of 0.78). They
conclude that the augmented Solow model provides a satisfactory explanation of cross-country
variations in (long-run) income.
Does the Mankiw et al. evidence negate our claim that one must understand the
determinants of a country's technological advancement to understand its long-run
performance? We believe not. First, it should be noted that the adjusted R2 falls to 0.28
when the sample is restricted to the 22 OECD countries. In the estimation of the basic Solow
model without the schooling variable, the fraction of the variation in OECD country incomes
"exp1ained by population growth and the investment ratio is only 1 percent! Mankiw, et al.
get most of their mileage from the large differences in investment ratios and population
growth rates between the rich and poor countries. But more to the point, we believe that the
assumption of a common rate of technological progress in all 98 countries over a 25-year-10-
period is simply indefensible. The rate at which producers in Japan have acquired new
technologies, be they technologies that were new to the global economy or those that were
new only to the local economy or the individual finn, has been markedly different than the
rate of technology acquisition in Chad, for example. Indeed, Wolff (1992) provides evidence
of strikingly different rates of total factor productivity growth in just the OECD countries
alone over the last twenty years.
How does this matter for the interpretation of the Mankiw et al. regressions? From an
econometric perspective, if technological progress varies by country and g1 is treated as part
of the unobserved error term, then ordinary least squares estimates of the Solow equation will
be biased when investment-GDP ratios are correlated with country-specific productivity
growth.4 In particular, if investment rates are high where productivity grows fast, the
coefficient on the investment variable will pick up not only the variation in per capita incomes
duetodifferences in countries' tastes for savings, but also part of the variation due to their
different experiences with technological progress.5
An economist certainly would expect investment to be highest where capital
productivity is growing the fastest. Indeed, Baumol et a!. (1989) report very high correlations
between total factor productivity growth and annual growth rates of capital labor ratios for
seven OECD countries in the period from 1880 to 1979. Figure 1, which shows the
relationship between productivity growth and investment ratios for a sample of 22 countries
for the period 1970 to 1988, suggests the same. So we are still left to explain why
technology has progressed at various rates in different countries in order to understand why
their investment rates have differed and thus so too have their growth experiences.If the nuclassical model with its focus on capital accumulation provides an incomplete
story of growth, what role can we attributetotechnological progress and what evidence do
we have that such progress is endogenous? Growth accounting is believed by some to
provide a method for answering these questions. The standard procedure decomposes
changes in output into parts associated with the growth of various inputs, and a residual. The
residual, which depending on the particular study may be large or small, is often taken to
measure the contribution of advancing technology to growth. Unfortunately, there are
problems with this interpretation. For suppose that Y =AKCL,where Y is output, K is
capital, L is labor and A represents the state of technology. As a matter of arithmetic, it is of
course true that the percentage growth in Y will be equal to the sum of the percentage growth
in A, a times the percentage growth in K, andtimes the percentage growth in L. But can
we conclude from this that the growth in A measures the full contribution of technological
change to the expansion in output? Evidently not. After all, technological improvements
typically raise the productivity of capital and thereby induce additional investments. In such
cases, the resulting capital formation ought not to be considered as an independent spur to
output, but rather as a facilitator of the growth that is due ultimately to theinnovation.6
Some might argue that the resources spent on commercial research and development
are too small for business-generated technological improvements to be the driving force
behind growth. It is true that, despite rapid growth in recent decades, business enterprise
R&D still comprises only about 2 percent of the domestic product of industry in the OECD
countries. But what generally gets recorded as R&D represents only a portion of the
resources that firms spend on learning to produce new goods or with new methods. Learning—12—
on the shop floor —consistingof manysmallimprovements in design and technique —isalso
important in the overall picture of technological advance. Moreover, knowledge is
cumulative, with each idea building on the last, whereas machines deteriorate and must be
replaced. In that sense, every knowledge-oriented dollar makes a productivity contribution on
the margin, whileperhapsthree-quarters of private investment on machinery and equipment is
simply to replace depreciation. Finally, social rates of return on R&D may substantially
exceed private rates of return. Detailed studies of particular innovations support this view
(Mansfield et al., 1977; Bresnahan, 1986; Trajtenberg, 1990), which suggests that resources
spent on commercial research may be especially productive in generating new output.7
A few recent papers are suggestive of the central role that endogenous technological
progress has played in recent growth experience. For example, Coe and Helpman (1993)
show that domestic and foreign "knowledge capital stocks" --thatis, accumulated spending
on R&D by a country and by its trade partners —bothhelp to explain the growth in total
factor productivity in the OECD countries. Eaton and Kortum (1993) and Lichtenberg (1992)
find, respectively, that the number of national scientists and engineers and the level of
spending on R&D enter significantly in the determination of a country's income level, in an
empirical framework similar to Mankiw et al. Most significantly, Caballero and Jaffe (1993)
have begun the arduous task of estimating and calibrating a full general equilibrium model of
innovation-based growth, to see how well the model can account for the trends in aggregate
productivity and consumption growth in the United States. Their findings are encouraging,
though not definitive.
Perhaps the most convincing direct evidence in favor of viewing industrial innovation—13--
as the engine of growth comes from the work of economic historians. For example, Landes
(1969) describes the role that new technologies played in spurring the industrial revolution,
while Rosenberg (1972) provides a comprehensive survey of the relationship between
technological advances and American economic growth since the early iSOOs. The latter
account, especially, leaves little room for doubting that the bulk of technological progress has
been purposive and profit driven. And Fogel (1964), though trying to argue that the railroads
were not indispensable to American growth in the nineteenth century, nonetheless estimated
that this single innovation added 5%toU.S. GNP by 1890.
As yet, no empirical study proves that technology has been the engine of modern-day
growth. Still, we ask the reader to ponder the following: What would the last century's
growth performance have been like without the invention and refinement of methods for
generating electricity and using radio waves to transmit sound, without Bessemer's discovery
of a new technique for refining iron, and without the design and development of products like
the automobile, the airplane, the transistor, the integrated circuit, and the computer?
MODFI 11MG INNOVATION-BASED GROWfH
We could go on at length about the potential usefulness of a theory of growth with
endogenous technology. But the proof of the pudding is in the eating! In theremainder of
this article we will sketch how recent research has attempted to incorporate industrial
innovation into growth theory and describe some of the issues that the new models are able to
address.—14—
We begin with the would-beinnovators.Presumably, they invest resources in the
hopeofdiscovering something of commercial value. This could be a better method for
producing some good, a new good that serves an existing function, or an entirely new type of
product that has no close substitutes among goods already on the market. In any case, the
innovators expect to be able to turn a profit on the fruits of their research efforts.
Evidently, we must depart from the common practice in neoclassical growth theory of
assuming that all firms act as price takers in an environment of perfect competition. Firms
must be able to sell their products at prices in excess of unit production costs if they are to
recover their up-front outlays on research and development. In other words, some imperfect
competition in product markets is necessary to support private investments in new
technologies. The new growth models draw on advances in the theory of industrial
organization for their microeconomic details.
Let us take an example based on Grossman and Helpman (199 Ia, ch.4). We begin
with the case of a closed economy, but later discuss the implications of international trade.
Supposethata competitive consumer goods industry uses n different intermediate inputs in
the production of a single, homogeneous product. Say that the production function is
Cobb-Douglas, with uniform input shares (although the latter assumption could be relaxed).
For the moment, also suppose that these intermediates are the only inputs into the production
of the final good. Let each input have its own quality ladderw; that is, a boundless sequence
of potential quality improvements, where each new generation of input performs
proportionately better than the last. Prospective innovators invest in R&D in an attempt to
step up the ladder for one or more of these intermediate products.8—15—
A successful innovator devises an input that is more productive than the similar input
of earlier generations. If the country's patent system effectively protects the innovator's
property rights over this new invention, the innovator will have the exclusive right to produce
the new product. The firm that markets the superior input may well be able to earn
monopoly profits in competition with the extant producers of previous generations of the
product. We assume that this is the case, and that producers engage in price competition.
Then the market leader earns a stream of monopoly rents that serve as the reward for its
prior research investment. These rents continue until a rival firm discovers and perfects still
a better version of the same product.9
Next we consider the R&D process. Some of the recent growth theory treats R&D
like any other production activity, automatically converting primary inputs into an output --in
this case, knowledge (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, l991a, ch. 3). However, many
observers have stressed the inherent uncertainties associated with industrial research and the
fact that producers using newly introduced technologies rarely achieve commercial viability
until after they experience a prolonged period of learning-by-doing (Rosenberg, 1982). The
work of Young (1993) captures this second aspect of the research technology, whereas our
own work has incorporated only the first. Here, let us suppose that firms devoting resources
to R&D buy themselves a chance at developing the next generation of some targeted product.
In particular, let us make a firm's probability of research success proportional to the labor
employed in its research lab. Newcomers may enter freely into the research activity, and
firms invest in learning up to the point where the marginal cost of additional inputs into R&D
equals the expected gain (increased probability of success times the market value of a new—16—
product)that those inputs provide.
Most of the contributors to the new literature on innovation-based growth have
adopted a general equilibrium perspective. In the example described here, such an equilibrium
has the following features. First, oligopolistic competition determines sales and profits for
firms offering the various generations of each intermediate input. Second, the supply of
savings from households and businesses matches the demand for funds by would-be investors.
Third, the value of extant producers on national asset markets reflects the expected present
discounted value of the profits those firms will earn, in view of the anticipated (but uncertain)
subsequent evolution of technology in the industry. Fourth, supply equals demand in the
competitive market for the homogeneous consumer good. And finally, the labor market
clears at a wage that equates demands by manufacturers and researchers to the total available
supply.
This sort of model predicts sustained growth in per capita output. Output expands in
the steady state despite the fact that population size is constant and the economy has no
physical capital. Here the economy grows because intermediate goods are forever being
improved, thereby raising productivity in the assembly of final output.10 The innovation
process has a distinct Schumpeterian flavor, inasmuch as successful innovators displace
previous industry leaders and snatch from them a share (here 100 percent) of industry profits.
At the micro level the growth process is uneven and stochastic. Firms continually race to
bring out the next generation of product, but there may be long periods without a success in
some industries. Meanwhile, other industries may experience rapid successions of research
breakthroughs. Aggregation masks this micro-level turbulence and the macroeconomy grows—17—
at a steady pace when the number of intermediate inputs is large.
In this model, the costs and benefits of industrial research determine the pace of long-
term growth. The model predicts, for example, that a boost in the profitability of R&D, as
might result from an increase in the magnitude of the typical quality improvement, attracts
additional resources into R&D. Then the growth accelerates, not only because the quality
steps are larger, but also because advances come more rapidly. As another example, if
households become more patient in their savings behavior, the cost of R&D financing falls
and again the rate of innovation rises. Finally, if a scientific breakthrough raises the
productivity of researchers in the commercial laboratory, the profitability of R&D rises and
some resources would be released from their former research activities and become available
to engage in new projects. Innovation is spurred on both accounts.
Capital Accumulalion
It is straightforward to introduce capital accumulation into this story of
innovation-based growth. Capital might be used in the industries producing intermediate
goods, the sector producing final goods, or both. For simplicity, supposeit is only used in
final goods production and let us rewrite the aggregate production function as Y =
whereY now denotes final output, K and L are capital and labor used in
producing this output, and Z is an aggregate measure of intermediate inputs (adjustedfor
their quality). We assume also that the single final good Y can be used either for
consumption or for investment purposes. That is, output of Y that is notconsumed adds to
the aggregate capital stock. We ignore depreciation.—18—
In this specification, the forces that drive long-run growth remain the same as before.
The profitability and cost of industrial research determine the rate at which the intermediate
inputsclimbtheir respective quality ladders. Improvements in the quality of intermediates
boost the productivity of physical capital. So the endogenous learning here --likethe
exogenous technological progress of the neoclassical model --preventsthe marginal product
of capital from falling to the point where investment ceases to be profitable. Innovation
sustains both capital accumulation and growth.
It is interesting to note that with plausible and realistic parameter values, the
predictions of this model roughly match the recent U.S. experience. Suppose we assign
capital a share of 30 percent (a =0.3),labor a direct share of 35 percent (l-a- =0.35),
andintermediates (also embodying labor) the remaining share of 35percent,in the production
of final goods. Suppose further that we take the subjective discount rate of households to be
5 percent, and assume that each research success generates a 5percentimprovement in the
quality of some intermediate product. Then, if we choose the parameter reflecting the
productivity of labor in the research lab to be consistent with an annual growth rate of 2.5
percent,the formulas in Grossman and Helpman (199la, ch. 5) imply that R&D spending will
comprise 1.6 percent of sales, while investment will take up 10 percent of output. We see
that business R&D need not absorb vast resources for innovation to be the engine of
reasonably rapid growth.
Human Capital
Cross-country regressions point to the special role that human capital plays in the—19—
growth process (Barro, 1991; Romer, 1989b;Marikiw,Romer, and Weil, 1992; and others).
However, different authors have interpreted the positive partial correlation between growth
rates and various proxies for the stock of human capital in different lights. We, like Romer
(1989b), see human capital as the accumulation of time spent in schooling and training. In a
finite lifetime, an individual's human capital cannot grow without bound. However, the skills
that an individual acquires may be applied to an ever improving set of production
technologies, in which case the value of human capital will continually rise through time.
A simple, albeit misleading, way to think about human capital in our model is as a
measure of the size of the (effective) labor force. With more labor, the economy could
undertake either more R&D, more manufacturing, or more of both activities. In fact, our
model predicts that more labor will be employed in both of these uses in the new equilibrium,
with the expansion of employment in R&D generating an increased rate of product
innovation. This prediction of the model, while consistent with the positive correlation
between human capital and growth, has the counterfactual implication that larger economies
always grow faster.
A realistic extension of our framework can reconcile the observation that countries
with more human capital grow faster with the fact that sheer size does not always promote
growth. Suppose there are two different sectors producing final output. Let the sectors be
distinguished both by their relative use of skilled versus unskilled labor and by their potential
for technological improvements. For example, the sectors might represent industries such as
apparel arid footwear, on the one hand, and consumer electronics, on the other. Suppose
further that each young person decides whether to acquire any human capital beyond primary—20--
education and if so, how much. In this setting (described further in Grossman and Helpman,
199la, ch. 5)largereconomies do not always grow faster. A large economy with an
abundanceof skilled labor will conducta great deal of industrial research, because R&D uses
thisfactorintensively. Such an economy will grow faster than another with less human
capital. But a large economy populated mostly byunskilledindividuals might grow more
slowlythan another with a smaller population. The large labor-abundant country, which
specializes relatively in labor-intensive production, might well conduct absolutely less
industrial research than a smaller country with a comparative advantage in R&D.
Growth and Welfare
Since the times of Adam Smith, economists have wondered whether the invisible hand
of the market generates the socially desired pace of economic expansion. With its
assumptions of exogenous technology and full appropriability of investment, the neoclassical
growth model delivers an unequivocal answer. The government need do nothing to promote
accumulation and growth, it tells us, provided that individuals are far-sighted in their savings
behavior and take into account the well-being of their offspring. Under these conditions, the
equilibrium growth path will be socially efficient.
The recent contributions to growth theory cast doubt on this conclusion. When
growth is driven by endogenous innovation, two obstacles stand in the way of market
efficiency. First, efficiency dictates marginal cost pricing, but innovation requires the
existence of monopoly profits. Second, efficiency demands that investment returns be fully
appropriable, but the characteristics of knowledge suggest that spillovers will be prevalent.—21—
Romer (1990) describes one kind of spillover from industrial research: as firms develop new
technologies they sometimes make scientific discoveries with more general applicability.
Suchdiscoveriesmay be difficult to patent and difficult to keep fromthe public domain.
Aghion and Howitt (1992)andGrossmanandHelpman (1991a,ch. 4)highlightanothertype
of externality: when innovators bring out successive generations of similar products, each
begins where its predecessors left off. For example, a new entrant into the personal
computer industry seeking to improve upon the state of the art need not make its own
progression from the abacus to the analog computer to the digital computer to the PC.
Instead, it can inspect the latest generation of products available on the market and extract
much of the cumulative investment in knowledge that is embodied in them.
The fact that endogenous innovation will not necessarily occur at an optimal rate does
not immediately tell us whether it will be too fast or too slow. The spillovers emanating
from the industrial research lab suggest that markets provide insufficient incentive for
investments in knowledge. The inability of innovators to capture all of the consumer surplus
from their new products points to the same conclusion. But the setting of imperfect
competition precludes any simple policy prescriptions. Overinvestment in R&D can occur
because innovators respond to private profit signals, which may diverge from measures of
social profitability. Consider for example a firm that invests in a new technology merely to
displace an existing one. Evidently, this firm has calculated that the profits it can capture by
taking over the market exceed the cost of the investment. But much of the profit may come
at the expense of the extant industry leaders, so that the invention's contribution to total
industry profits may fall short of the research costs. If such occurrences are frequent, the—22—
economy will devote too many resources to R&D and too few resources to manufacturing
with currently available technologies. See Stokey (1992) for further discussion.
The new models allow for rigorous welfare analysis on issues like these. They also
permit an examination of the efficacy of alternative corrective policies. In situations where
the market equilibrium entails too slow a pace of technological progress, the models predict
(unsurprisingly)thatan R&D subsidy, by raisingthe privateprofitability of R&D, can be
used to spur innovation and growth. These simple modelscanalso highlight pitfalls in the
use of some policies that might seem to be good substitutes for an R&D subsidy. For
example, Grossman and Helpman (1991a, ch. 3) show that policies that subsidize of
innovative products may slow the rate of technological advance. Although such policies
typically enlarge the reward available to a successful innovator, they may also raise the cost
of innovation by bidding up the salaries of scientists and engineers)'
The endogenous innovation paradigm could readily be extended to handle a host of
other important policy questions that bear on growth performance. Future research will
undoubtedly ask: To what extent can policies that promote accumulation of human capital
substitute for policies that directly encourage investments in technology? Should collaborative
research projects be encouraged or discouraged by the antitrust authorities? What factors
determine the optimal length and breadth of patent protection? And so on.
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE
Growth theory traditionally has treated each country as if it were an island unto itself.—23—
Extensions of the theory to a world with international trade and capital flows have been left
as esoteric exercises for algebra lovers. If ever this practice was defensible, surely it is no
longer. Countries trade with one another, communicate with one another and learn from one
another more than ever before. The increased exchange of goods and ideas has fostered a
growing interdependence among countries' technological fortunes and long-term
performances. When the new models of endogenous innovation are extended to include
international movements of goods, capital, and ideas, they yield a theoretical framework that
is rich in predictions and consistent with a host of observed phenomena.
Dynamic Comparative Advantage
We suppose now that there are two countries and two consumer-goods sectors. One
of these sectors comprises a range of different products, each one of which can be improved
in the research lab. Since all innovation in the economy will be confined to these products
we will refer to this as the "knowledge-intensive" or "high-technology" sector. The other
consumer-good sector is a traditional one, producing a homogeneous product under
competitive conditions, with no prospects for technological progress. All production and
research activities make use of two primary factors, human capital and unskilled labor.
It may be that the high technology products manufactured in one country can be
improved as readily by research labs in a foreign country as they can by labs located nearby.
This would describe a situation where technological spillovers --implicitin firms' abilities to
base their research efforts on the existing state of the art --arefully international in scope.
When researchers worldwide draw on a common knowledge base, the history of—24—
technologicaladvance in any one country has no bearing on the long-run pattern of
international trade. The country that has the greater relative abundance of skilled labor will
specialize relatively in the most human capital-intensive activity --namelyindustrial research.
Evenifthis country initially produces few knowledge-intensive products, it will, over time,
win more than its share of the technology races. In the longrun,the human capital-rich
country will come to acquire leading positions in relatively many of the high-technology
industries and will export these goods in exchange for the labor-intensive product of the
traditional manufacturing sector. In short, relative factor endowments will determine the
long-run pattern of trade.
While this finding is reminiscent of the familiar Heckscher-Ohlin theory of
international trade, the model also captures the insights of several other strands of recent
literature. For example, the model predicts an ever evolving web of intraindustry trade.
Each country exports the high-technology products of industries in which its firms enjoy a
technological lead and imports the products of industries where its firms lag behind.
Moreover, if countries' relative endowments differ significantly (or if transport costs are
large), direct foreign investment and international patent licensing may take place.
Companies with headquarters and research facilities located in the high-wage country may
open their own plants in the foreign country or rentN their technologies to foreign producers.
The choice between these alternative modes of technology transfer depends (among other
things) on the advantage that indigenous producers enjoy relative to foreigners in operating a
plant in the low-wage country and on the cost that firms must incur to write and enforce
contracts regulating the use of their patent rights.—25—
While it may appear to the casual observer that knowledge always flows rapidly and
costlessly around the globe, the reality sometimes is different. The concentration of
high-technologyindustries in particular locations such asthe Silicon Valley and Route 128
suggeststhatsome benefit exists from physical proximity to other researchers, perhaps
becausenewideas arespread byskilledpersonnelwhose geographicmobility is somewhat
restricted, or because firms that are geographically close are exposed more often to the
products of their nearby rivals.
The existence of local or national technological externalities introduces an important
role for history in the determination of dynamic comparative advantage (Grossman and
Helpman, l991a, ch. 8). Such spillovers can generate a self-perpetuating process whereby an
initial lead, however generated, is sustained indefinitely into the future, regardless of
country's relative factor endowments. A model with these features predicts long-lasting
effects of temporary industrial policies and may lend theoretical support for some popular
arguments in favor of an aggressive response to perceived foreign targeting of
high-technology industries (for example, Tyson, 1992).
Integration and Growth
Research on endogenous innovation has helped to elucidate several reasons why
participation in a larger world economy may speed a nation's growth (Rivera-Batiz and
Romer, 1991). First, residents of a country that is integrated into world markets are likely to
enjoy access to a larger technical knowledge base than those living in relative isolation.
Trade itself may help the process of technological dissemination, if foreign exporters suggest—26—
waysthattheir warescanbe usedmoreproductively or foreign importersindicatehow local
productscanbe made moreattractiveto consumers in their country (Grossman and Helpman,
1991b). Second, exposure to international competition may mitigateredundancyin industrial
research. Whereas a firm that develops a product for a protected domestic market need only
make use of technologies that are new to the local economy, one that hopes to compete in the
international marketplace will be forced to generate ideas that are truly innovative on a global
scale.
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) suggest a third reason: by expanding the size of the
potential customer base, international integration may bolster incentives for industrial
research. But as Grossman and Helpman (1991a, ch. 9) and Feenstra (1990) have noted, a
countervaiJing force may be at work here. More open trade will increase the profitability of
R&Dina country or region only if its firms can hold their own in the rivalry with foreign
firms. For potential innovators in a small and isolated country, or those operating where
skilled labor is relatively scarce, this need not always be the case.
While many economists firmly believe that more open trade must always promote
more rapid expansion, Grossman and Helpman (1991a, ch. 9) have constructed several
examples of cases in which closing off trade might actually increase a country's long-run
growth rate. First, a country with a relative abundance of natural resources and unskilled
labor and a relative paucity of skilled workers may be induced by trade to specialize in
activities that make use of those resources, somewhat at the expense of human-capital
intensive activities like R&D. 12 It may be that industrial output will grow more slowly in
the long run than it otherwise would if these countries were forced to devote more of their—27—
resources to developingnew technologies orproducing innovative goods. Second, if
technological spillovers are national in scope, then researchers living in a country with a
small knowledge base may find it difficult to compete with rivals in a country with more
experience in conducting research. Long-run growth might be faster in such a country if it
were to allow itself to catch upw before fully exposingitselfto world competition.
These arguments should not be taken to imply that ihiberal trade policies would
generally be beneficial to a country that sees slower growth as a result of openness to trade.
A country that lacks the size and technological experience to support a world class R&D
effort, or one that has the endowments appropriate to activities like agriculture and mining,
typically will gain from specializing in the production of goods that do not require the latest
technologies. A country like Saudi Arabia --totake an extreme example --mustsurely be
better off trading its oil for manufactured goods than it would if it tried to develop and
produce the latest high-technology goods itself. Although its GD? may grow more slowly in
the long run when it specializes in drilling oil, the present discounted value of its
consumption stream will almost certainly be higher. The point worth emphasizing here is that
output growth rates do not measure economic welfare.t3
Southern Imitation and the Product Cycle
Another type of technological interdependence arises in trade between the North and
the South. Whereas many firms in the industrialized North race to bring out the latest
innovative products, most firms in the developing South confine their technological efforts to
imitating products developed abroad. This pattern of invention in the North and imitation in—28—
the South gives rise to a product cycle in international trade: Northern firms produce and
export many goods early on in their technological lives, then manufacturing shifts to the
South as production methods become more widely known.
It may seem, as many Northern companies who have lost market share and profits to
Southern imitators insist, that such product-cycle trade must be detrimental to the incentives
to invest in new technologies. But this is not necessarily so. The new endogenous growth
models identify two opposing effects of product cycle trade on the incentives to innovate.
The first is the one that the unlucky Northern firms point to: imitators cut into the rewards
that accrue to the originators of new ideas. But whereas no Northern innovator wants to see
its own technology copied, every such firm is happy to see foreign companies master the
technologies of its domestic rivals. When this happens, production migrates abroad, and
resources are released by the targeted producers. Some of these resources may find their way
into the factories of the surviving Northern manufacturers of innovative products. Then sales
for these firms will expand and profits rise. In short, while a faster rate of Southern
imitation means a shorter duration of monopoly profits for the typical Northern innovator, it
may also mean a higher level of profits while that monopoly position lasts.
Grossman and Helpman (1991a, chs. 11 and 12) offer models which illustrate that
product-cycle trade --byeasing Northern manufacturers' demands for scarce resources --
actuallycan accelerate innovation and growth in the global economy. Indeed, Helpman
(1993) takes the argument one step further, by demonstrating that the North actually benefits
in welfare terms from a relaxation of Southern enforcement of intellectual property rights,
provided that the initial rate of imitation is not too high.—29—
CONCLUDINGREMARKS
Economic policy makers face the difficult question of how best to promote rapid,
sustainable economic growth in the face of depletable stocks of irreproducible natural
resources. Improvements in technology are the best chance we have to overcome the
apparent Ulimits to growth. If greater output requires greater tangible inputs, then it seems
more than likely that the flxity in the supplies of various of the earth's resources eventually
will mean an end to rising per capita incomes. But if mankind continues to discover ways to
produce more output (or better output) while conserving on those inputs that cannot be
accumulated or regenerated, then there seems no reason why living standards cannot continue
to rise for many centuries to come.
We do not profess to understand fully the determinants of technological progress. But
we do believe that stylized formal models such as the ones we have described can help us to
attain this goal. Growth theory has taken a step in the right direction by including aspects of
reality --imperfectcompetition, incomplete appropriability, international interdependence, and
increasing returns to scale --thatsurely are important to understanding how much an
economy will invest in knowledge of various kinds. We hope that knowledge in this
particular area of economics, like other knowledge in the economy at large, will continue to
accumulate at a rapid rate.-30-
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I.Many atthbute the idea thatgrowth can be sustained byspilloversfrom investments in
physical capital to Romer (1986). But a careful reader will note that the "K" in Romer's
model, at least according to the author's interpretation, refers to "knowledge," not "kapita]."
Romer argued that the special properties of knowledge make spilovers likely and growth
sustainable. In his later papers (for example, Romer, 1990) he refined his views about the
treatment of knowledge, arguing that private investments in knowledge could only take place
in a market environment with imperfect competition.
2. Solow (1970, p. 34) also discussed the possibility that increasing returns to scale could
preserve a high marginal productivity of capital. However, he regarded it as "difficult to
believe that the United States is enabled to increase output per man at something over 2 per
cent a year mainly by virtue of unexploited economies of scale."
3. In the United States alone, more than 12,000 industrial research labs are actively
searching for profitable innovations. And in Japan, more than 80% of all R&D, including
much research as well as development, is financed by private industry. See Nelson and
Rosenberg (1992).
4. Another point, a bit outside the main line of our argument, may be even more telling. Not
only investment ratios, but also population growth rates should be viewed as endogenously
determined. It is well known from discussions of "the demographic transition" that
population growth rates tend to decline as incomes rise. This may be because children act as
a substitute for retirement savings in countries with imperfect capital markets. In any event,
the large negative coefficient on n1 in the full sample estimates may reflect the fact that low
income causes fast population growth, rather than the other way around. Becker, Murphy,
and Tamura (1990), among others, have made a promising start at modeling the joint
determinants of population and output growth.
5.Thesame problem of interpretation arises for the myriad of regressions that have been
computed to explain variation in growth rates across countries. These regressions invariably
include the beginning-of-period income level and the investment-GDP ratio, along with a
number of the researchers' own favorite variables. A positive coefficient on the investment
ratio is a robust finding (Levine and Renelt, 1992), but since the regressions omit any direct
measures of a country's state of technical knowledge, this variable may be picking up the
effects of disparate technological progress on the growth rate.
6. The incorporation of "R&D stocks" (the accumulated value of R&D spending after
allowing for some depreciation) as a separate input into aggregate production does not get
around the problem, either. As Nelson (1973, 1981) and others have noted, there is an
"adding up" problem here: if there are increasing returns to all inputs, including the
technology input, then not all factors can be paid their marginal product. Factor shares
cannot be used to infer output elasticities. Leaving this aside, it is still true that the
profitability of investment depends on the state of technology, and attributing growth to
proximate sources reveals nothing about the underlying mechanisms.—35—
7. It shouldbenoted, however,thatDc Long and Summers (1991) also find very high social
rates of return for investment in fixed equipment.
8. In some other examples of endogenous growth theory, like Romer (1990), Grossman and
Helpman (1991a, ch. 3), and Young (1993), innovation serves to expand the variety of
available goods. Aghion and Howitt (1992) treat the case of cost-reducing innovations.
Their paper, which predates our own work on quality improvements, develops a model that is
similar in many respects to the one described here.
9. We could also incorporate the (realistic) possibility of imitation of the state-of-the-art
product; see Grossman and Helpman (1991a, ch. 12) and Segerstrom (1991).
10. Confusion has crept into the literature concerning the role of intermediate goods in the
growth process. It makes no difference whether innovation takes place in sectors producing
intermediate goods or final goods.
11. This is a good place to note the mileage one gets from treating questions about the
optimal pace of innovation and growth using general equilibrium methods. Of course, one
does not need a general equilibrium model to capture technological spillovers, and the
inevitable link between market power and innovation has long been recognized in industrial
organization. However, partial equilibrium analysis cannot capture the competition of
manufacturing and R&D activities for a common set of resources in a setting where one
activity cannot expand except at the expense of the other. In our view, such competition
accurately reflects the situation in what is often called the "high technology" sector.
12. For example, resource-rich countries like Canada and Australia devote far smaller shares
of their national outputs to R&D than do resource poor countries at a similar stage of
economic development.
13.In Grossman and Helpman (199la, ch. 8) we discuss at greater length why a country
may gain from trade even when that trade has an adverse impact on its long-run growth rate.
We present an interesting example where a country that would innovate if it remained isolated
instead specializes in the production of traditional goods when it trades with a country that
has a technological head start. Yet trade equalizes wages across the two regions, whereas the
lagging country would always have the lower real wage in the absence of trade.F
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